We introduce a logic BI in which a multiplicative (or linear) and an additive (or intuitionistic) implication live side-by-side. The propositional version of BI arises from an analysis of the proof-theoretic relationship between conjunction and implication; it can be viewed as a merging of intuitionistic logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The naturality of BI can be seen categorically: models of propositional BI's proofs are given by bicartesian doubly closed categories, i.e., categories which freely combine the semantics of propositional intuitionistic (...) logic and propositional multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic. The predicate version of BI includes, in addition to standard additive quantifiers, multiplicative (or intensional) quantifiers ∀ new and ∃ new which arise from observing restrictions on structural rules on the level of terms as well as propositions. We discuss computational interpretations, based on sharing, at both the propositional and predicate levels. (shrink)

This paper calculates, in a precise way, the complexity of the index sets for three classes of computable structures: the class $K_{\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}}$ of structures of Scott rank $\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}$ , the class $K_{\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}+1}$ of structures of Scott rank $\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}+1$ , and the class K of all structures of non-computable Scott rank. We show that I(K) is m-complete $\Sigma _{1}^{1},\,I(K_{\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}})$ is m-complete $\Pi _{2}^{0}$ relative to Kleen's O, and $I(K_{\omega _{1}^{\mathit{CK}}+1})$ is m-complete $\Sigma _{2}^{0}$ relative to O.

Niniejszy artykuł jest recenzją ważnej pracy Ewy Bińczyk Uspołecznienie Antropocenu. Ekowerwa i ekologizowanie ekonomii z 2023 roku, wydanej w wiodącej humanistycznej serii „Polityka w kulturze” Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. Streszczając podstawowe ustalenia książki, wskazuję na bogactwo interpretowanych w niej teorii i odautorskie ujęcia współczesnych nurtów ekonomii ekologicznej i teorii dewzrostowych. Podkreślam jej istotność jako przekonującej recepty na to, jak można skutecznie włączyć nauki humanistyczne i społeczne w debatę na temat katastrofy klimatycznej i sposobów na odwrócenie dewastowania społecznego świata. (...) Recenzowana książka przekonuje, że dzisiaj, jak nigdy wcześniej, potrzebujemy humanistyki, która chce zmieniać świat, dobrze zorientowanej we współczesności, jednocześnie eksperckiej i popkulturowej. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics implies many paradoxes (e.g. Schrödinger's cat, double-slit experiment, non-locality) which are in contradiction to our ordinary experience. To comprehend quantum theory we must revise our understanding of such matters as the objective nature of reality, the nature of causality, and the nature of a complex system and its relation to its components. Finally, common sense seems to be an epistemo-logical obstacle in our understanding of the quantum picture of the world.

In my paper I review the main strategies adopted by two leading schools in cognitive science, symbolic artificial intelligence (AI) and connectionism, in modeling time-dependent phenomena such as learning. In particular, I briefly mention shortcomings of non-monotonic logic approach that dominates symbolic AI. I also discuss the problems that beset the recurrent networks approach advocated by connectionists (e.g., S. Grossberg) and philosophers (e.g., P. Churchland), who focus their attention on oscillatory behavior of such networks. I point out that neither approach (...) adequately captures essential features of the dynamics of human temporal awareness. Finally, I develop certain ideas borrowed from neurophysiologists (e.g., W. Freeman) and system theorists and describe the brain-mind, the entity that is capable of producing temporal awareness, as a self-organizing system that exhibits chaotic dynamics and generates a dynamic structure that resembles the chaotic hierarchy o Rossler. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God by Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P.Roger W. NuttThe Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God. By Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 270. $99.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-19-968858-6.The centrality that Christ’s death by crucifixion has in Christian life, doctrine, and culture is scarcely in need of elaboration. Nevertheless, the relation between the (...) will of the Father and the violent and humiliating manner of Christ’s death raises substantive questions concerning the internal coherence of Christian claims about the love, goodness, and justice of God. In The Father’s Will: Christ’s Crucifixion and the Goodness of God, Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., confronts these questions, openly acknowledging their difficulty and seriousness, and provides a philosophically precise and theologically fresh response to the challenges they pose to the credibility of the Christian message.The ten chapters of The Father’s Will are divided into tripartite units that progress in logical sequence from “philosophical prolegomena” (part 1) to “New Testament evidence” (part 2), culminating with a “theological [End Page 317] evaluation” (part 3). The question at the heart of the book is how to reconcile the Christian doctrine that God and evil are incompatible with the theology of the Cross, which seems to require that God’s will is implicated in the evil actions that bring about Christ’s death.The first five chapters (part 1) provide a philosophical analysis of intention (chap. 1), value and obligation (chap. 2), double-effect reasoning (chap. 3), the ethical problems associated with self-sacrifice (chap. 4), and God’s will in relation to the crucifixion (chap. 5). Drawing on his analysis of intention and employing the principle of double effect, Lombardo establishes that it is not necessary to conclude that God wills the evils that are attendant on Christ’s death. “Actions performed by rational intentions,” Lombardo explains, “are not only intended; they are also willed. Rational intending implies rational choice, and rational choice is an act of the will” (32). This understanding of intention and willing, as distinguishable from intentional action, provides a foundation upon which the moral goodness of actions can be determined. “For an action to be good,” Lombardo argues, “it must do more than simply advance our natural inclinations: it must also avoid frustrating them. Only actions that both advance our natural inclinations and avoid frustrating them are morally good” (49). When moral actions have good effects and nonintended bad effects that do not outweigh the good effects—as in cases of self-defense or the use of medicine and medical procedures—these complex actions retain their moral goodness, notwithstanding the bad effects. The reason for this is that the bad effects are not included in the agent’s intention. Lombardo presents the crucifixion of Christ as one of these complex cases in which the bad effects can be separated from the agent’s intention. Chapter 3 explores the reasoning associated with the principle of double effect to clarify how actions implicated in bad or evil effects can be judged to be morally good. Lombardo is hesitant to identify double effect as an isolated principle that is applicable within unique circumstantial cases. Rather, he presents double effect as “merely an algorithm for applying basic concepts to morally ambiguous actions” (72). For example, in addition to affirming that the intended effects of the action are consistent with our natural inclinations, in cases of double-effect reasoning “the action’s positive, intended effects [must] outweigh the action’s negative, nonintended effects” (73). This material, in turn, connects logically with the conclusion of chapter 4 on the ethics of self-sacrifice: “double effect reasoning shows that it can be acceptable, and even heroic, to cause our own death non-intentionally for the sake of some greater good” (79). The last chapter in part 1 applies these distinctions to the problem of God’s will and the moral evil involved in Christ’s crucifixion. Here, the basic dilemma that the book addresses is succinctly restated: “Being all good, God never wants... (shrink)

Book review: Polska filozofia chrześcijańska XX wieku. Stanisław Kamiński, Kazimierz Marek Wolsza [Polish Christian Philosophy: Stanisław Kamiński and Kazimierz Marek Wolsza]. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Ignatianum w Krakowie, 2019, ss. 232.

With his customary incisiveness, W. V. Quine presents logic as the product of two factors, truth and grammar-but argues against the doctrine that the logical truths are true because of grammar or language. Rather, in presenting a general theory of grammar and discussing the boundaries and possible extensions of logic, Quine argues that logic is not a mere matter of words.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:156 BOOK REVIEWS human being with happiness" (p. 34). I would only add that happiness is the reward of any reader who gives this book the attention that it deserves. Center for Thomistic Studies Houston, Texas JOHN F. x. KNASAS Henry VIII and the Conforming Catholics. By PAUL O'GRADY. Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1990. Pp. 186. $11.95 (paper). The careers and writings of what this author has called (...) " Conforming Catholics " have been generally neglected by historians of the English Reformation, at least until recently. That is why it is even more remarkable that not only one, but two books should be published in 1990 on this subject. Glyn Redworth's life of Stephen Gardiner, bishop of Winchester (Jn Defense of the Church Catholic, London: Basil Blackwell) is primarily a historical and biographical account of this pivotal anti-papal Catholic, with particular emphasis on the period from 1540-1547. This book, while complete and well written, concentrated on the life of Bishop Gardiner almost to the exclusion of his writings, though some of these were mentioned in passing. Paul O'Grady's book suffers from almost the reverse of that problem. In his Introduction, he contends that " intellectual systems, once generated, have a logic of their own." His concentration on the " intellectual system " of anti-papal Catholicism at times overwhelms the historical considerations of the period, and he falls into at least the neglect of what Professor Geoffrey Elton calls " uncertainty as to what actually happened." Dates are plentiful in this consideration, to be sure, but the events selected are limited, and one gets the impression that there is quite a bit more to the story than the author is letting on. Quite a bit of familiarity with the period is assumed by the author on the part of the reader, and much that is quite germane to the topic and useful to following the text is relegated to footnotes. The great contribution of this study is that it raises a number of names to a higher profile, and highlights their writings. Gardiner, though relatively neglected (at least until recently), is one of the few names that surface about which a biography has been written. There has been a significant amount of groundwork done for this book, and merely the listing of titles by these authors is a valuable contribution. But there are problems, some of which are hardly the fault of the author. O'Grady uses the term "Henrician Catholic" in a number of BOOK REVIEWS 157 places, which causes one to wonder, what was the Catholicism of Henry VIII himself? J. J. Scarisbrick, in his magisterial biography of the king, certainly goes over the evidence, and O'Grady adds nothing new. The sources are scanty, and one is forced at times to make a series of assumptions (based on Henry's choice of bishops and councilors, for example) about what Henry actually believed that eventually become a series of assumptions piled on top of other assumptions. Noticeably and significantly absent from the consideration of Henry's management of his ecclesiastics is any attention to Henry's plan for the formation of a strong Tudor monarchy within England, the long standing work of Professor Elton. Foreign policy, another issue in the religious settlement of the period, is mentioned occasionally and briefly (here Professor Redworth's book more than makes up the difference). One cannot attempt to determine the king's theological positions in a vacuum, and although Henry VIII did (and still does) have some reputation as an " amateur theologian " in the period in question, there are few purely theological statements by that monarch. Theology, to all appearances, was just one lever used by Henry in erecting a strong modern state: the imposition of theological and liturgical uniformity was almost always a means to political uniformity, as the Prayer Book Revolts in Cornwall and the West showed in Edward's reign. Another problem arises in determining who, exactly, is an Henrician Catholic? It is fairly simple to differentiate this group from the Reformers -the controversies over the Sacrament and justification by faith do this clearly. But how can they he separated from the Roman Catholics? O'Grady... (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Quine ist ein Klassiker der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Doch Quine erläutert nichts und erklärt wenig. Der von ihm angenommene Leser etwa seiner berühmten Aufsatz-Sammlung From a Logical Point of View ist der Fachkollege, der ebenso wie Quine die jeweilige aktuelle Debatte genau kennt. Die vorliegende zweisprachige und vor allem vollständig durchkommentierte Ausgabe legt drei seiner wichtigsten Aufsätze aus dieser Sammlung (On What There Is / Über was es gibt, Two Dogmas of Empiricism / Zwei Dogmen des Empirismus und Reference and Modality / (...) Referenz und Modalität) vor. Auf diese Weise kann sich jeder Leser mit diesen gedanklich faszinierenden Texten beschäftigen. (shrink)

This paper analyses the concept of the relation of alternativity between possible worlds, the primary concept for relational semantics. We have focused only on epistemic and doxastic logics. The paper presents two approaches to these logics: J. Hintikka’s position and R. Stalnaker’s position.

“O, rocks!” Molly exclaims in impatience with Bloom’s first definition of metempsychosis, “tell us in plain words” . Looking forward, then, we remember that Bloom asks Murphy if he has seen the Rock of Gibraltar and asks further what year that would have been and if Murphy remembers the boats that plied the strait. “I’m tired of all them rocks in the sea,” replies Murphy . Bloom’s interest derives from Molly’s connection with Gibraltar, and Molly herself in her monologue remembers (...) the boats well and thinks of missing the boat at Algeciras , just before the book ends with her thoughts of the awful deepdown torrent,” the tide that moves like a river through the strait. Imaginatively she moves with that torrent, figuratively the torrent of time that plunges from the future to the past, which she accepts, with her yes, going deeply with the flow of life, and with her goes Murphy/Joyce, touching on Gibraltar at last. Molly remembers Ulysses S. Grant getting off a boat in Gibraltar, an occurrence that Adams sees as unduly stretching probability merely in order to bring Molly in incidental touch with a man named Ulysses.19 But remembering that Murphy is a “wily old customer,” we may remember also that the Ulysses of Joyce’s favorite Dante cannot rest with Penelope but, in search of knowledge and excellence, moves on through the two rocks of the straits of Gibraltar, the pillars of Hercules, to further adventure and also to destruction; and we may then think that with this reference, Joyce took pains to tell us that the Ulysses of this book here completes in hidden climax the design and purpose of his work, and sails on to oblivion, or rather to dispersion and reconstitution as everyone in the new adventure of Finnegans Wake. 19. See Adams, Surface and Symbol, p. 233. Ralph W. Rader, professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, is the author of Tennyson’s “Maud”: The Biographical Genesis. He is currently working on a theoretical study of form in the novel and other genres. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry include “The Literary Theoretical Contribution of Sheldon Sacks” and “The Dramatic Monologue and Related Lyric Forms”. (shrink)

O'Donnell, J. R. Anton Charles Pegis on the occasion of his retirement.--Conlan, W. J. The definition of faith according to a question of MS. Assisi 138: study and edition of text.--Spade, P. V. Five logical tracts by Richard Lavenham.--Maurer, A. Henry of Harclay's disputed question on the plurality of forms.--Brown, V. Giovanni Argiropulo on the agent intellect: an edition of Ms. Magliabecchi V 42.--Synan, E. A. The Exortacio against Peter Abelard's Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum et Christianum.--Fitzgerald, W. Nugae Hyginianae.--Sheehan, M. (...) M. Marriage and family in English conciliar and synodal legislation.--Shook, L. K. Riddles relating to the Anglo-Saxon scriptorium.--Boyle, L. E. The De regno and the two powers.--Colledge, E. A Middle English Christological poem.--Gough, M. R. E. Three forgotten martyrs of Anazarbus in Cilicia.--Häring, N. Chartres and Paris revisited.--Hayes, W. Greek recentiores, (Ps.) Basil, Adversus eunomium, IV-V.--Owens, J. The physical world of Parmenides. (shrink)

An accurate analysis of the text shows that the small treatises have a logical structure and a style which is in all aspects unspinozistic. The main points of difference are : a formalistic interpretation of mathematics‚ the opposition between mathematics and physics‚ slavish cartesianism‚ the presence of numerous pleonasms‚ carelessness of expression‚ parade of learning‚ prolixity‚ attention for irrelevant qualities of authors quoted‚ educational purpose. Together with De Vet’s demonstration that the author of SRR and RK is still alive in (...) 1693 (see Tijdschr. v. Filosofie 45‚ 1983) these arguments force us‚ to consign Spinoza’s authorship‚ recently still defended by Petry a.o.‚ to the realm of fancy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dewey on Metaphysics, Meaning Making, and Maps James W. Garrison Blueprints and maps are propositions and they exemplify what it is to be propositional.1 [E]very characteristic trait is a quality.... produced and destroyed by existential conditions.2 John Dewey's claim that there are metaphysical generic traits of existence the theory of which provides "a ground-map" for cultural criticism remains controversial. I will work along two intertwining lines to try and (...) clear things up a bit. First, many assume that his reference to a metaphysical map is a metaphor. My paper will show that he uses the idea of a map consistently in many different places throughout his career. Second, my paper will examine how Dewey functionally coordinates ordinary existential traits and their maps within his theory of judgment. We will find that the generic traits and the ground-map of criticism connect in much the same way. Before examining Dewey's theory of judgment, I want to say something about where Dewey's metaphysics fits into his empirical "denotative method." In the conclusion, we wiU look at where metaphysics fits into the architectonic of his entire phUosophy. In between, we wiU examine maps functioning as propositions (especiaUy logical and mathematical universals) as weU as ever-evolving guides to unending inquiry in an unfinished and unfinishable universe. Eventually we wiU see why Dewey insists that "the social" is "The Inclusive PhUosophic Idea." Metaphysics, for Dewey, is simply one tool of cultural criticism among others. First and Last Philosophy in Dewey's Denotative Method Dewey's "denotative method" moves from the immediately given intuitive meanings of qualitative "having" of experience that impart a "sense" of a qualitative, organically whole TRANSACTIONS OFTHE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY Vol. 41, No. 4 ©2005 O situation from whence we may select traits, through the experience of "significant " linguistic meanings, such as the propositions of judgment, to the experience of "knowing" as the product of the logical process of inquiry, and back again to primary experience.4 Each phase interpenetrates every 3 other. Here is how Dewey describes the trans-action between primary, noncognitive and secondary, cognitive experience in his original (1925) >■$ introduction to Experience and Nature: ^r There are two avenues of approach to the goal of philosophy. We may " begin with experience in gross, experience in its primary and crude forms ^ [e.g., traits].... Or, we may begin with refined selective products, the a most authentic statements of commended methods of science [e.g., ¿q maps], and work from them back to the primary facts of life. ^ P TT ϕ > Philosophy may start with either immediate existential experience or the 3 experience of mediating meanings. While we may distinguish these two L starting points, we should never construct a dualism from them since both jx occur within experience.6 Dewey explains that "the subject-matter of primary experience sets the problems and furnishes the first data of reflection ""O which constructs the secondary objects of reflection."7 Further, "crude or macroscopic experience" provides the "test and verification" of the secondary objects of reflection. Secondary objects "explain the primary objects, 2 they enable us to grasp them with understanding!'9 The two starting points " differ in direction, but eventually they close to form a circle of expanding? dence. They may then pioneer new pathways, or, having different values, D choose to construct different kinds of maps. ^ Douglas Browning distinguishes "three phases of discussion of the start- 0 ing point."23 The first concerns "the designation of a certain subject matter P1 referred to under the names 'experience' and 'my life'."24 Dewey's empirical « denotative method selects aspects from immediate qualitative experience. The >% second phase involves two things: First, "a reflective moving away from and looking back upon that subject-matter" and, second, "the bringing of a puta- S tive characterization against it." Browning's example of characterization is g "the catalogue of the generic traits of experience." The generic traits are not S antecedent to inquiry; rather they are the products of reflection used to char- 5 ' acterize primary experience. Browning observes that characterization is always ^ provisional; as we wiU find, Dewey insists that the theoretical map proposi- ^ tionaUy representing the existential... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:358 BOOK REVIEWS ing and his arguments seem more tentative and relativistic than those offered in his previously published works (Truth and Other Enigmas, 1978; The Interpretation of Frege's Phuosophy, 1981, etc.). Yet he uses his mastery of powerful logical techniques in order to support the chosen positions. This fact might give great satisfaction to a logician, hut the metaphysician may he somewhat disappointed by the meager results attained, (...) though Dummett himself modestly restricts his goals to those of forming only " a base camp for an assault on the metaphysical peaks...". One may also wonder whether Dummett remained faithful to his methodological requirement of the priority of meaningtheory with regard to logic and metaphysics. Doesn't Dummett's acceptance of intuitionistic logic (with its rejection of the principle of bivalence) dictate his preference for a certain meaning-theory, and not the other way around? To distill and extract metaphysical beliefs and insights which are contained (perhaps tacitly) in the working of our language is undoubtedly a legitimate goal of any philosophical enterprise. But our ambitions go beyond this goal: we are reaching after reality itself, not just after our opinions about reality and their semantical elucidation. In this respect Dummett's programmatic conception of metaphysics may face serious difficulties in attempts to climb the ahovementioned metaphysical peaks. On the other hand, is any metaphysical program exempt from such difficulties? The hook is beautifully printed; Harvard University Press has done an excellent job! The Index, which combines names and subjects, is a hit too economical, omitting certain references (for example, important remarks on God's omniscience on pp. 75-76). AUGUSTIN RISKA Saint John's University New York, New York Ethical Practice in Clinical Medicine. By WILLIAM J. ELLOS. New York: Routledge, 1990. Pp. 190. Medical ethics is an integral part of the science and art of medicine. Rather than being a set of norms or regulations added from external sources, such as the legal norms regulating the medicare program, the norms and maxims of medical ethics are integral elements of medicine arising from the relationship between physician and patient. In one way or another, most philosophers of ethics and medicine would agree with the foregoing statements. But once the role of ethics in medicine has BOOK REVIEWS 359 been established, a serious difficulty arises: What method should he used to define and delineate ethical norms for particular cases? More to the point, how should one go about solving problems in medical ethics? Father William Ellos, S.J., is concerned with resolving the difficulty of method in medical ethics. He seeks to develop and explain a method in medical ethics that will be both clinical and pragmatic. Joining with other specialists in the field, he opts for a virtue-centered approach to solving issues in medical ethics, as opposed to a rulecentered duty-based approach. While not rejecting the ethical method featuring the principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice derived from W. D. Ross (an approach favored by so many contemporary scholars in the field of medical ethics), he does maintain that these principles are greatly overworked as well as simplistic. He proposes virtue-centered reasoning as a better method of ethical endeavor, especially attuned to the complexity and problematics of clinical ethics. In developing the notion of virtue·centered ethics, Ellos considers the contributions of the past and present thinkers to this method of ethical decision making. Hence, Plato, Aristotle, Thomas, the Scottish Enlightenment Philosophers, and American Pragmatists are the main sources of his reflections upon virtue ethics. Ellos finds a culmination of virtue ethics in the present-day tendency of many consultants in medical ethics to classify themselves as casuists, indicating that they are eclectic and pragmatic in their efforts to solve clinical cases. In the course of the historical and analytical sections of this work, Ellos demonstrates not only a wide acquaintance with classical and contemporary authors but also an ability to discern continuity of thought among these well.known philosophers and theologians. Especially significant is his recognition of the too often neglected contemporary authors Collen Clements and Roger Sider, whose accurate indictment of the principle of autonomy as interpreted by present-day medical ethicists restores the... (shrink)